By Matthew Bloodgood and Lon Bartel for Calibre Press

“The officer failed to use cover.”

This statement, or variations of the theme, frequently appears in plaintiff and prosecution complaints filed against officers. For example, in an intermountain state, two officers were searching for a suicidal male who had assaulted his mother with a knife. The two officers did not locate the subject and returned to the residence to speak to his mother.

While talking to the woman, the subject approached the officers. The officers were positioned between the mother and the subject while attempting to talk to him.

The subject removed an eight-inch butcher knife from his coat. He challenged the officers, swore at them, and demanded they shoot him.

After a brief moment, the subject saw his father looking at him through a window. The subject turned from the officers and walked around the corner. There was a door into the house immediately adjacent to the window the father was looking from.

The officers followed the subject, concerned he would enter the house and attack his parents. As the officers turned the corner, the subject moved the knife into an overhead stabbing position and started toward the nearest officer. The two officers fired their handguns in self-defense and the subject died.

During the subsequent civil action, the plaintiff’s use of force expert accused the officers of failing to maintain cover, or an intermediate barrier. The investigation demonstrated that for the officers to use available cover, or an intermediate barrier, they would need to abandon the elderly parents and move in the opposite direction toward their patrol vehicles. This would have placed the parents in significant danger from someone who had already assaulted one of them with the knife. The officers acted as biological “cover,” using their bodies to protect the family. In law enforcement vernacular, the officers acted as “soft body armor” for the family members.

In an east coast criminal prosecution of an officer, the officer was engaged in a foot pursuit when the suspect fell. The suspect rose into a kneeling position. The officer reported the suspect was reaching toward the right front waistband of his pants. The officer feared the suspect was attempting to retrieve a weapon and fired his duty weapon in self-defense.

The prosecution use of force expert also stated the officer failed to use cover and wait for backup officers before engaging the subject. A review of the crime scene demonstrated there were no structures or objects one could consider “cover.” There was a parking garage 40-50 yards away, or the officer would have to cross a four-lane road to find a parked car. This would require the officer to turn his back on a known threat to run away and find cover at a considerable distance.

“Cover” is often portrayed by plaintiffs or prosecutors as a cure-all de-escalation technique. The complaint typically states the officer failed to use cover to “buy time,” therefore allowing the officer to “de-escalate” the situation. “Cover” is not a mystical thing which is suddenly available in every situation, and if used, would automatically bring the situation to a peaceful resolution. It is an unrealistic expectation.

Traditionally, “cover” has been described and trained as something that will stop or deflect bullets. The issue for officers is understanding and identifying what provides effective ballistic protection in the midst of an event. We also want to differentiate between ballistic protection and the use of “cover fire” or “directed cover fire.” Cover fire is a military application of firepower to suppress an enemy allowing for movement through a dangerous location. Directed cover fire is accurate shot placement designed to suppress a subject who is shooting from a position of advantage.

A more effective definition and realistic expectation of “cover” is an object or structure which impedes a specific attack. As previously described, sometimes “cover” is the muzzle of the officer’s weapon and their body armor.

Cover is not a 100% guarantee of safety for any of the incident participants, nor does it ensure a resolution without the use of force. Columbus, OH Police Officer Steven Smith was shot and killed while he was in the turret of an armored vehicle.1 Two Anchorage, AK police officers were wounded after a suspect shot at them with a rifle. One was behind an armored vehicle, the other was behind a rifle-rated barricade.2

Whether a subject attacks an officer, or an officer uses some measure of force, there are four probable outcomes3 and each of the four outcomes is affected by potentially tens of thousands of contextual variables.4 The possible outcomes are: The subject’s attack or the officer’s use of force was effective, not effective, had limited effectiveness, was initially effective but was overcome.

The use of cover may impact the effectiveness of a subject’s attack, but those same factors may impact an officer’s ability to respond or apply an effective force technique. In other words, what affects the suspect’s efforts will likely affect the officer’s efforts.

Additionally, an officer’s ability to recognize effective cover and utilize it are affected spatially, temporally, and whether the officer perceives “cover” while attending to other contextual factors within the incident. Although there may be an object, or structure, present which may afford cover, that does not mean the officer perceives its presence while being affected by numerous perceptual factors in a high stress, high consequence event.

Cognitive processing is serial, meaning one decision is made at a time. If the officer’s focus is pulled to a specific decision-point, all resources are directed there, thus impacting attentional and decision-making processes related to other factors present in the incident.

“Cover” is a changing variable based in contextual circumstances, environmental conditions, subject behavior, officer behavior, the relationships between those behaviors, and the psychophysiological factors affecting them. “Cover” is not an absolute problem solver in every situation. Cover may not be present, recognized, or immediately useful in every situation and should not be presented as such.

References

  1. https://www.wdtn.com/news/columbus-swat-officer-steve-smith-dies-after-gunshot-sustained-in-sunday-shooting/, https://www.odmp.org/officer/22831-police-officer-steven-michael-smith
  2. Anchorage, AK Police Department case number 16-39809
  3. Reality Based Training Instructor Certification course. https://rbta.net/course-descriptions/
  4. Shane, J, & Swenson, Z. (2019). Unarmed and Dangerous: Patterns of Threats by Citizens During Deadly Force Encounters with Police. Routledge. pp. 14, 25

About the Authors:

Matt Bloodgood is a retired sergeant from the Anchorage Police Department and is a regional training coordinator for Idaho POST. Matt has a Master of Science degree in Human Resource Development. He has over 33 years of experience and 27 years of experience as an instructor in the use of force, firearms, less lethal weapons, SWAT tactics, and other disciplines. Matt may be contacted at [email protected].

Lon Bartel is the Principal Researcher at VirTra, a leader in simulation-based training for military and law enforcement. With over 20 years of law enforcement training experience, he was recognized by Arizona P.O.S.T. as an expert in firearms and defensive tactics and is a founding member and lifetime advisor of the Arizona Tactical Officers Association.

He holds a Master’s in Applied Exercise Science and a Bachelor’s in Exercise Science, with certifications in performance enhancement. His peer-reviewed research includes perception-response times and weapon transition performance. Pursuing a Ph.D. in Performance Psychology, Bartel integrates physiological and psychological expertise to improve decision-making under stress, promoting life-preserving strategies in law enforcement and combat.